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FOREWORD
Stanley Mosk*
While I was serving as Attorney General of California the
mail brought a letter one day from an irate housewife in Ven-
tura enclosing broken pieces of a plastic cosmetics jar. She be-
lieved she had purchased a jar full of a popular rejuvenating
cream, but when the opaque jar accidentally fell and broke she
observed a hidden inner lining with air spaces between the lining
and the walls of the jar itself. This resulted in reducing the ap-
parent quantity of cream by nearly one-third. What, she de-
manded, was the State of California going to do about this?
We began an investigation and to our surprise learned that
almost every cosmetics jar on the shelves of California shops con-
contained a similar false bottom and false side walls. While only
a few manufacturers actually misrepresented the net weight on
their labels, it was my belief that the inner lining constituted a
visual falsification, since consumers had a right to rely on the ex-
terior size of the container as an indication of the quantity of its
contents regardless of weight.
Fortunately our research revealed a previously unused sec-
tion of the Business and Professions Code' which specifically pro-
hibits containers made with "a false bottom, false side walls,
false lid or covering, or . . . otherwise so constructed or filled,
wholly or partially, as to facilitate the perpetration of deception
or fraud." Armed with that statutory authority I called a meet-
ing of major cosmetics manufacturers and their counsel and
warned them that I was about to enforce the law. However, if
they would restructure their packaging at once, I would defer
proceedings to seize those offending jars presently on the shelves.2
The cosmetics representatives attempted to rationalize the de-
ceptive containers-false sides and bottoms were said to be
desirable for heat insulation-and then protested they could not
make containers exclusively for California since their products
were marketed nationally. The law is the law, I insisted, and if
* Stanley Mosk, since 1964 a Justice of the California Supreme Court,
served as Attorney General of California from 1959-1964.
1. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 12605 (West 1964), as amended, CAL. Bus.
& PROF. CODE § 12606 (West Supp. 1974).
2. Id. This code section permits seizure of deceptive jars.
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they elected to forego the California market-ten percent of the
nation-that would be their choice. The ultimate result: they re-
vised their containers; the statute and the dignity of California
were upheld and consumers searching for the fountain of youth
were not denied their full measure of the indescribable variety of
beauty preparations. As a postscript: we discovered that many
products other than cosmetics similarly violated deceptive pack-
aging proscriptions and we took comparable corrective steps in
those instances.
During my years as Attorney General I established an active
consumer fraud section and a business fraud section, as well as an
antitrust division, all designed to use the power of government to
protect consumers from overreaching business enterprises. Those
who succeeded me in that office have maintained and expanded the
same services.
But even an aggressive and vigilant government cannot as-
sume the entire burden. Unfortunately there is no sure way in
which the gullible can be protected from the avaricious in mod-
em society. If one chooses to buy the Golden Gate bridge-be-
fore inflation boosts the price-it is unlikely that even the most
alert governmental agencies will be able to deter him. But to
throw up our hands in despair because all the simpletons in our
midst cannot be saved would doom the majority of good peo-
ple who may have ascended a rung or two higher on the credulity
ladder to a sad economic fate. Fortunately, for the sake of our
pride and our purse, government-legislatively and judicially-
has manifested a growing concern for our well-being as con-
sumers. That is the theme of this thoughtful and useful issue of
the Santa Clara Lawyer. It will be cited often.
One effort of the judiciary, with which I am now concerned,
has been helping to shape the consumer class action. Its devel-
opment in recent years has been significant and rapid. In some
circumstances caveat emptor has been superseded by caveat ven-
dor.
Even though consumer class actions are deemed a contem-
porary phenomenon, from the inception of its judicial system
California has recognized representative suits protecting the eco-
nomic interests of affected groups. In the very first volume of
California Reports, the Supreme Court permitted an action on be-
half of shareholders of a joint stock company to dissolve the
company and distribute assets, even though some of the share-
holders--ordinarily necessary parties-were out of state.3  The
court described the rule in terms that could be adapted to current
consumer class actions:
3. Von Schmidt v. Huntington, I Cal. 55, 68 (1850).
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Where the question is one of a common or general interest,
or where the parties form a voluntary association for public
or private purposes, the persons interested are commonly nu-
merous, and any attempt to unite them all in the suit would
be, even if practicable, exceedingly inconvenient, and would
subject the proceedings to the danger of perpetual abate-
ments and other impediments. . . .
In 1872, section 382 of the Code of Civil Procedure5 was
amended to provide for representative actions: "[w]hen the ques-
tion is of a common or general interest, of many persons, or
when the parties are numerous, and it is impractical to bring
them all before the court, one or more may sue or defend for
the benefit of all."6
For the next nine decades, however, California courts
adopted a restrictive view of class actions, until the horizons were
expanded by such contemporary decisions as Chance v. Superior
Court,' Daar v. Yellow Cab Co., 8 and Vasquez v. Superior Court.9
The latter two cases resulted in relaxation of several of the previ-
ously significant barriers to consumer class actions: (1) the nec-
essary parties requirement; (2) the common fund requirement;
(3) the identifiability of the ascertainable class at the outset of
the action; and, (4) the necessity of total identity of facts for
each class member.
By mentioning California cases I do not mean to imply this
state is alone in consumer protection progress. Significant de-
cisions can be found in many jurisdictions, such as Florida,1"
New York,"1 Ohio,' 2 Illinois"3 and New Jersey. 14  In Kugler v.
Romain,'6 the Supreme Court of New Jersey specifically grounded
its approval of a class action suit against sellers of "educational"
material on our decision in Vasquez.
There have been pragmatic reasons for judicial improvisa-
tion in the field of consumer protection. Unfortunately, in the
eyes of many critical observers, some administrative agencies,
particularly at the federal level, have not been as vigilant in pro-
tection of consumer rights as they could be. Professor Louisell
has written, "administrative agencies such as the FTC, FCC, and
4. Id. at 66-67.
5. CAL. CIV. PRO. CODE § 382 (West 1973).
6. id.
7. 58 Cal. 2d 275, 23 Cal. Rptr. 761, 373 P.2d 849 (1962).
8. 67 Cal. 2d 695, 63 Cal. Rptr. 724, 433 P.2d 732 (1967).
9. 4 Cal. 3d 800, 94 Cal. Rptr. 796, 484 P.2d 964 (1971).
10. City of Miami v. Keton, 115 So. 2d 547, 552 (Fla. 1959).
11. Hall v. Coburn Corp., 26 N.Y.2d 396, 259 N.E.2d 720 (1970).
12. Robnet v. Miller, 152 N.E.2d 763 (Ohio App. 1957).
13. Kimbrough v. Parker, 101 N.E.2d 617, 618 (Ill. App. 1951).
14. Kugler v. Romain, 58 N.J. 522, 279 A.2d 640 (1971).
15. Id.
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ICC have failed to live up to the high promises of their golden
years."'" Former Commissioner Nicholas Johnson of the FCC
has attributed the lack of administrative vigilance to ineffective
counsel, inadequate investigative facilities, public ignorance of
agency policies and failure of agencies to encourage effective citi-
zen participation.' 7
The omissions of the administrative process and the some-
what tardy response by legislative bodies created a vacuum
which the judiciary necessarily filled. To support that theme, in-
stead of my undertaking an immodest description of our court's
rationale which resulted in the widely discussed Vasquez opinion,
I yield again to Professor Louiseil:
In Vasquez, the court freely acknowledges social, legislative,
and judicial considerations, beyond the facts of the instant
case, which support a class action in a consumer fraud situa-
tion. The court begins discussion of the availability of a class
action by considering the position of a consumer in modem
society. "Protection of unwary consumers from being duped
by unscrupulous sellers is an exigency of the utmost priority
Throughout the opinion, the court is sensitive to
the social realities which are entwined with the facts being
asserted. The opinion notes the lack of bargaining power
of the low income consumer, the widespread use of high
pressure sales techniques, and the possibility that, in the ab-
sence of a class action, the individual consumer may lack
a remedy for fraud. Equally important, the court specifically
enumerates some of the anticipated results of allowing a class
action, noting the importance of such an action as an effec-
tive sanction against the wrongdoer, and as a deterrent
against other illegitimate practices. Given these societal con-
siderations, the class action is a significant step in equalizing
the bargaining power of the consumer with that of the seller.
This step helps achieve optimal working of the judicial sys-
tem for, as so often stated, the adversary process functions
best when the opposing parties are equally powerful.,
I do not imply, by the foregoing generous quotation, that
Vasquez and similar decisions were free from criticism. Quite the
contrary, representatives of some business and financial institu-
tions read ominous implications into the judicial trend. A counsel
for a national lending corporation wrote: financial companies
"may cease to do business with any dealer who lacks suffi-
16. Louisell, Miller & West, Comments on Vasquez v. Superior Court, 18
U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1056, 1063 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Louisell].
17. Johnson, A New Fidelity to the Regulatory Ideal, 59 GEo. L.J. 869
(1971).
18. Louisell, supra note 17 at 1062 (footnote omitted).
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cient financial backing to substantially satisfy any legal liability
that the financial institution may incur by reason of the breach
of his warranties."'" I for one do not see that as quite the evil the
writer implied it to be. Another business writer decries the class
action as "essentially. a device to impose the loss on the innocent
lender after the dealer has made his money and moved or become
judgment-proof. The better method of protection is prevention
through consumer education and state policing. "20
The class action remains controversial. Its value is inevitably
in the eye of the beholder. There are its critics who are concerned
about the impact on business enterprises primarily and financial
institutions secondarily. There are those who believe the class
action imposes an unmanageable administrative burden on thejudicial process and creates grave problems of due process. Still
others doubt that the minimal benefits to generally apathetic
named and unnamed plaintiffs justify the usually generous re-
wards harvested by victorious counsel.
On the other side of the debate are those who are con-
vinced the consumer class action is a healthy tonic for the free
enterprise system. It restores faith in our judicial system to those
*whose resources are limited and who could not, unless joined
together with many others, obtain redress for a grievance that
may be minor in the broad economic scheme but major to a neces-
sitous individual. It aids the judicial process by combining into
one lawsuit many small actions that would otherwise be tried sep-
arately. It can serve to prevent a fraudulent business operation
from retaining its ill-gotten gains and finally, by penalizing com-
petition that defrauds, it aids the vast majority of legitimate bus-
iness firms that operate with high standards of integrity.
Whether consumer class actions are a placebo or a panacea,
or something in between, remains to be determined. The jury
is still out. While we await the ultimate verdict, I am hopeful
that consumer class actions will be given every reasonable exper-
imental opportunity under the tender guidance of wise and imagin-
ative trial judges.
19. Baronoff, Comments on Vasquez v. Superior Court, 18 U.C.L.A. L. REv.
1091, 1096.
20. Smit, Are Class Actions for Consumer Fraud a Fraud on the Consumer,
26 Bus. LAw. 1053, 1078 (1971).
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